If your usage is covered by fair use, it doesn't require the approval of the rights holder and can't constitute a copyright violation.
But this is arguing semantics, the problematic word being copyright violation. It goes against my intuition (and I suspect I'm not alone) to say that a violation of copyright has taken place when a usage is legal within the rules instituted by copyright.
I suppose people who associate a different set of semantics with copyright violation would have to talk about legal copyright violation versus illegal copyright violation. To me, the former is contradicting and the latter is a tautology.
> But this is arguing semantics, the problematic word being copyright violation. It goes against my intuition (and I suspect I'm not alone) to say that a violation of copyright has taken place when a usage is legal within the rules instituted by copyright.
Yes semantics, but in law there is an established convention with reference to these particular semantics. The term "infringement" refers to, in this context, whether or not there was copying. Fair use is a defense, wherein even if infringement is established, liability is not established if the copying isn't the sort that should establish liability.
> I suppose people who associate a different set of semantics with copyright violation would have to talk about legal copyright violation versus illegal copyright violation. To me, the former is contradicting and the latter is a tautology.
That's because the headline using terminology imprecisely. It is using "ruled" when it means "found" (juries find facts, judges make rulings); it is using "violation" when it means "infringement."
It is a semantic argument, but I'm pretty sure US law treats fair use as a limit on copyright rather than as an excused copyright violation.
rgoddard seems to be implying that all copying of a copyrighted work is illegal, which simply isn't the case. His claim is analogous to claiming that driving at any speed is in violation of the speed limit, but if you driving under the posted limit you can use that as a defense in court.
> This means that, in litigation on copyright infringement, the defendant bears the burden of raising and proving that his use was "fair" and not an infringement. [emphasis mine]
Just like in a murder trial where the defendant clearly killed the victim, the defendant must prove that he or she acted in self-defense. That doesn't mean that self-defense is murder.
You're mostly right, kind of. I'm going to try and explain this, but it's not particularly easy. The confusion comes from both the nature of the "fair use" defense and the collision of legal vocabulary and common language.
Fair use is an affirmative defense, which means that even if a violation occurred in a strict sense, that violation is excusable. It's not an "I didn't do it" argument, it's an "I shouldn't be punished because..." argument. Self-defense is a textbook example of an affirmative defense -- strictly speaking, I would violate the law by intentionally injuring or killing someone, but I can argue that I was defending myself.
The question of an affirmative defense is not even relevant until there is a prima facie case showing violation, and often the fact-finder (jury or, in a bench trial, the judge) will actually find all the facts necessary for a judgement that infringement occurred before addressing the question of fair use, partly because the answers to many questions of fact for infringement are relevant to whether "fair use" holds.
In the end, you do end up with a judgement that no infringement occurred, but along the way, you often end up with findings of fact that do spell out a "violation".
> You're mostly right, kind of. I'm going to try and explain this, but it's not particularly easy.
You did a good job, but I'd be interested to see how important details like this are thoroughly explained to a jury that's actually making a decision like this.
The instructions themselves look like they'd be tens of pages of text printed out. (And note that the people deciding this are specifically chosen for their lack of background in the technologies involved --- IIRC, two candidate jurors with software experience were excused, for that very reason.)
That's a bit unfair. Oracle objected to two candidate jurors with software experience, yes, but at least not officially "for that very reason".
One candidate was an HP employee and Oracle objected on the ground that Oracle has a separate suit with HP. When asked of opinions about patents, the other candidate said he has his strong opinion about patents. I mean, we all do... But I think objections were justified.
Don't you agree that if you think software patents should be abolished, you should not be a juror in a software patent case?
If 1/12th of the overall population thinks that way, it does not seem unreasonable for a jury of 12 to be a fair cross-section of the population. In fact, the opposite seems unreasonable to me.
I don't think that it's the court's job to ignore laws that are unpopular. In that way, anyone who admits to having a strong opinion, which may preclude them from objectively interpreting and applying the laws that do exist to the case at hand, should not be on the jury. We're not polling the population/jury "should these actions should be illegal?" but instead asking "given the laws today, are these actions illegal?"
But this is arguing semantics, the problematic word being copyright violation. It goes against my intuition (and I suspect I'm not alone) to say that a violation of copyright has taken place when a usage is legal within the rules instituted by copyright.
I suppose people who associate a different set of semantics with copyright violation would have to talk about legal copyright violation versus illegal copyright violation. To me, the former is contradicting and the latter is a tautology.