> If the article has some length, it's because it takes the subject seriously and doesn't compromise on nuance and context just for clicks.
And yet it feels fluffy. The incident could be described in a single paragraph. The response could be an other. The organisation of the crew training and how it effected the incident could be third, while future instances when the lock was used could be a fourth. So about 800 words, compared to the 3000 words it is.
Multiple of us on this comment thread feels it is fluffy, you are asserting it is not. But you are not providing any reason other than that the author is a professional and we should trust them? That is not quite convincing when at the same time I am reading their fluffy article.
Why do i feel it is fluf? Because the article is going on and on while not answering any of the basic questions I have: what did factually happen in the cabin? Did he just say what he said and then went sulking? Did he move closer to the hatch? Was he trained on how to operate the hatch? How long did the fix take? What were the consequences on the schedule? What were the consequences on the experiment itself? (Did it perform as intended after the fix or did it only hobble?) Why did they had highly trained payload specialist if they were not given latitude to perform fixes? You don’t need a physicist to push buttons on a schedule. Did NASA let any further payload specialist who had this deep connection with one of the experiments on? Were fixes performed by the payload specialist a normal thing ever?
Did anyone from Nasa follow up with him? Was this a misunderstanding? Are we sure he didn’t just say he is not going to return to space one more time just to try his experiment again?
Where the expectations about the experiment shared between the experimenter and mission control? Have they discussed contingencies in the planning steps? Did they in future spaceflights?
But they could say: “oh, the actual incident is just a jumping off point, the article is about the human factors and how we should design machinery to account for (and prevent) emotionally disturbed people harming themselves and others with them” in which case I have an other set of questions: space is not unique in the sense that people have access to simple means to end themselves. People who drive are often a simple twitch away from dying as surely as you do if you open a hatch in space. What are the statistics about that? Same about airplane piloting, same about weapons. In which ways is space different from the above, and in which ways is it the same? Are there other things to worry about, or is it only the hatch? Did anything similar ever happen on a submarine, or an artic station?
And instead of answering any of these important and interesting questions the author is going on in length what feels like the same 2 and half facts again and again.
Because the article is going on and on while not answering
any of the basic questions I have: what did factually happen
in the cabin? Did he just say what he said and then went
sulking? Did he move closer to the hatch? Was he trained on
how to operate the hatch? How long did the fix take? What
were the consequences on the schedule? What were the consequences
on the experiment itself? (Did it perform as intended after the
fix or did it only hobble?) Why did they had highly trained
payload specialist if they were not given latitude to perform
fixes? You don’t need a physicist to push buttons on a schedule.
Did NASA let any further payload specialist who had this deep
connection with one of the experiments on? Were fixes performed
by the payload specialist a normal thing ever?
About half of these were answered in the story, so I don't know, maybe you skimmed it too quickly. Read it again?
As for the rest, the author of the article went to some lengths to explain why information is scarce: most of the crew members are no longer living, Wang won't comment, and NASA apparently prefers not to remark on such a sensitive topic.
It's still quite an informative article, even though (by the author's own admission) questions remain unanswered. If the alternative was to simply not publish the article, I think they chose correctly. I certainly know a lot more about the topic than I did before reading it, which is a fine metric.
But they could say: “oh, the actual incident is just a jumping
off point, the article is about the human factors
Two thoughts here. One: you seem to have made that connection on your own, so kudos! I guess they didn't need to say it. Two: I mean, how would you have liked them to be more explicit about this?
And yet it feels fluffy. The incident could be described in a single paragraph. The response could be an other. The organisation of the crew training and how it effected the incident could be third, while future instances when the lock was used could be a fourth. So about 800 words, compared to the 3000 words it is.
Multiple of us on this comment thread feels it is fluffy, you are asserting it is not. But you are not providing any reason other than that the author is a professional and we should trust them? That is not quite convincing when at the same time I am reading their fluffy article.
Why do i feel it is fluf? Because the article is going on and on while not answering any of the basic questions I have: what did factually happen in the cabin? Did he just say what he said and then went sulking? Did he move closer to the hatch? Was he trained on how to operate the hatch? How long did the fix take? What were the consequences on the schedule? What were the consequences on the experiment itself? (Did it perform as intended after the fix or did it only hobble?) Why did they had highly trained payload specialist if they were not given latitude to perform fixes? You don’t need a physicist to push buttons on a schedule. Did NASA let any further payload specialist who had this deep connection with one of the experiments on? Were fixes performed by the payload specialist a normal thing ever?
Did anyone from Nasa follow up with him? Was this a misunderstanding? Are we sure he didn’t just say he is not going to return to space one more time just to try his experiment again?
Where the expectations about the experiment shared between the experimenter and mission control? Have they discussed contingencies in the planning steps? Did they in future spaceflights?
But they could say: “oh, the actual incident is just a jumping off point, the article is about the human factors and how we should design machinery to account for (and prevent) emotionally disturbed people harming themselves and others with them” in which case I have an other set of questions: space is not unique in the sense that people have access to simple means to end themselves. People who drive are often a simple twitch away from dying as surely as you do if you open a hatch in space. What are the statistics about that? Same about airplane piloting, same about weapons. In which ways is space different from the above, and in which ways is it the same? Are there other things to worry about, or is it only the hatch? Did anything similar ever happen on a submarine, or an artic station?
And instead of answering any of these important and interesting questions the author is going on in length what feels like the same 2 and half facts again and again.