> there are early-stage VCs these days, which don’t pressure founders for quick growth
That's really interesting. Do you know how they make that work, exactly?
I feel like that's naturally opposed to the standard incentive structures that VCs have with their LPs. They need to show results in O(years) so they can raise their next fund and keep the overall VC firm going over O(decades). That maps down straightforwardly to the day-to-day pressure VCs put on all their portfolio companies to grow as fast as possible.
Unless early-stage VCs are doing something new with the terms they give their LPs, how could they prioritize anything other than growth?
Down the grapevine at least, a couple Micro VCs ik provide a pipeline for CorpDev teams at larger companies and early stage VCs (Series A-C check signers like Unusual Ventures) to choose pre-vetted companies. Mind you this seems to be more Enterprise/B2B Micro VC oriented.
If the startup is showing good growth metrics, they'd point them to friends at later stage funds. If they aren't, they'd give intros and help get the startup aquihired.
- VCs don’t want founders to own 0% of their company because founders need to be motivated to work hard to make it a success
- % of dilution usually goes down very significantly over funding rounds
- there is significant competition between VCs to fund good startups these days, which can translate to founder leverage
- there are early-stage VCs these days, which don’t pressure founders for quick growth
- founders talk to each other and a large portion of founders are serial entrepreneurs. Reputation among founders matters to VCs
- looking over the longer term of decades, typical funding terms are getting much more founder-friendly