> No for micro-blogging, but Mastodon supports direct messaging, and if you support direct messaging, you should support end-to-end.
No other microblogging service with DM support has e2e anything. Because they're websites. To have meaningful e2e you need to have key exchange and device keys, and if you have a website you can look at your DMs on then the website has to have a key. If the website has a key the owner of the website can look at your DMs. This is just fundamental to hosted web services, and it's why if you use icloud messaging with imessage you're no longer guaranteed e2e, and why signal just doesn't even have a website for you to use.
LE has nothing to do with this? The key exchange I'm talking about is the end keys. User keys. LE doesn't provide those. For e2e IM systems a server has to manage user/device:key mappings, and are a central point of trust. They can potentially inject a "listening key" into your recipient list without you knowing and tap you or even impersonate you (but only in a forward way).
E2E is not a panacea, but it's also largely irrelevant to websites.
Eh, if you don't trust your masto instance admin to not read your DMs do you really trust them to not break the "your password never leaves the client" guarantees that protonmail for eg. promises?
This is the thing about this argument: Either you trust your instance admins or not. If they promise you e2e and you don't trust them, you should rightly look at that as snakeoil.
This is meaningless if you don't trust the site admins, and the reason to use e2ee in the first place is to avoid trusting the site admins. All it takes is for them to serve you different JavaScript one time that exfiltrates your messages, and I guarantee you'll never notice.
What I'm suggesting is that the same certificate infrastructure that is used to secure the connection between a server and a client could also be used to secure the connections between users.
There's nothing specific to HTTPS about CAs and trust chains.
But for encrypted DMs you need per user keys that are stored on the users computer, otherwise the owner of the server has control over the key and we're back at square one. Or am I somehow misunderstanding you?
No other microblogging service with DM support has e2e anything. Because they're websites. To have meaningful e2e you need to have key exchange and device keys, and if you have a website you can look at your DMs on then the website has to have a key. If the website has a key the owner of the website can look at your DMs. This is just fundamental to hosted web services, and it's why if you use icloud messaging with imessage you're no longer guaranteed e2e, and why signal just doesn't even have a website for you to use.
> Sure, but I trust https://letsencrypt.org/ more than I trust some random running a server.
LE has nothing to do with this? The key exchange I'm talking about is the end keys. User keys. LE doesn't provide those. For e2e IM systems a server has to manage user/device:key mappings, and are a central point of trust. They can potentially inject a "listening key" into your recipient list without you knowing and tap you or even impersonate you (but only in a forward way).
E2E is not a panacea, but it's also largely irrelevant to websites.