I don't think this is true. It's something that could be useful, with some sort of ACME-like automated issuance, but should definitely be issued from a non-WebPKI certificate authority.
> This is basically how Let's Encrypt / ACME accounts work
That's how they're implemented. How they "work" is a trivial pushbutton thing as documented by a well-known and trusted provider who cares deeply about simple user experience.
"Just self-sign a cert" is very much not the story XMPP wants their federated server operators to deal with.
I can't believe this was downvoted. Seriously a Certificate is binding a public key and the attributes (mainly the identity). If you don't need to use the attributes, you don't need a certificate!
Kubernetes is such a huge project that there are few reviewers who would feel comfortable signing off an an arbitrary PR in a part of the codebase they are not very familiar with.
It's more like Linux, where you need to find the working group (Kubernetes SIG) who would be a good sponsor for a patch, and they can then assign a good reviewer.
(This is true even if you work for Google or Red Hat)
It's not worth anyone's time to meticulously fact check known (and I'm being kind here) 'exaggerator' Sam Altman, because by the time you're done, he's already spread 10 more 'exaggerations'.
Various pieces support pieces for pod to pod mTLS are slowly being brought into the main Kubernetes project.
Take a look at https://github.com/kubernetes/enhancements/tree/master/keps/..., which is hopefully landing as alpha in Kubernetes 1.34. It lets you run a controller that issues certificates, and the certificates get automatically plumbed down into pod filesystems, and refresh is handled automatically.
Together with ClusterTrustBundles (KEP 3257), these are all the pieces that are needed for someone to put together a controller that distributes certificates and trust anchors to every pod in the cluster.
If they are using multitenant Docker / containerd containers with no additional sandboxing, then yes, then it's only a matter of time and attacker interest before a cross-tenant compromise occurs.
There isn't realistic sandboxing you can do with shared-kernel multitenant general-workload runtimes. You can do shared-kernel with a language runtime, like V8 isolates. You can do it with WASM. But you can't do native binary Unix execution and count on sandboxing to fix the security issues, because there's a track record of local LPEs in benign system calls.
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